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FEDERAL COURT REVIEW OF TRIBAL ACTIVITY UNDER
THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
ROBERT LAURENCE*

SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY'
The testimony that follows links the extension of the Indian
Civil Rights Act (ICRA) to the extension of Indian tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. My essential thesis is that with the ICRA in
place and providing federal court review of tribal activity, many of
the fears of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians are alleviated. The
ICRA provides for the protection of individual rights, using the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment as models. The
terms of the Act can be summarized this way: Tribal power must
be exercised in a way that is fundamentally fair to Indians and
non-Indians alike. Given federal court supervision of this fairness,
tribes should have the power to do what governments do-govern.
Thus, in my testimony I argue that intellectual and moral symmetry requires that if the ICRA is extended, then Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe2 must be reversed.
The testimony presents the following four propositions:
PROPOSITION ONE: Any extension of the ICRA must
be accompanied by a legislative reversal of Oliphant.
PROPOSITION TWO: The reversal of Oliphant must
come through a congressional acknowledgement of tribal
power, not through a delegation of it to the tribes.
PROPOSITION THREE: The ICRA is the perfect vehicle to overturn both Oliphant and Martinez.
PROPOSITION FOUR: Whether the ICRA is extended
by providing for collateral attack of tribal activity in federal district courts, or by providing for direct appellate
review in the federal courts of appeals, Congress should
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas.

1. This essay is nearly identical to testimony I submitted in writing and gave orally to
the United States Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs at its oversight hearings on
November 20, 1991. In preparation of the testimony, I sought advice, on very short notice,
from P.S. Deloria, of the American Indian Law Center, Inc., in Albuquerque, New Mexico;
Kevin Gover, of the New Mexico and District of Columbia Bars; Dena C. Dickinson, of the
Arkansas and Oklahoma Bars; and Donald P. Judges, Paul Schwartz and John J. Watkins, my
colleagues here at the University of Arkansas. They gave valuable advice, not all of which I
followed. Given the political nature of the issues covered here, there is more than the usual
compulsion to note that the opinions are mine, and not necessarily those of my advisors.
2. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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impose substantial abstention requirements to prevent
undue harm to tribal governments.
The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)3 is an exercise of congressional power which limits the governmental powers of Indian
tribes. It is structured like the Bill of Rights; its very existence
shows that the Congress recognizes that tribes are governments. It
seems clear, and the Court agrees, that when Congress enacted
the statute in 1968 it was both acknowledging the existence of
tribes as governments, and simultaneously acting to control potential abuses of the exercise of that governmental power.4
In 1978, the Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Marti5
nez limited the remedies available to plaintiffs seeking redress
under the ICRA by holding that the statute created no civil cause
of action that could be brought in federal court. 6 Because the statute contained no explicit federal civil cause of action, the Court
was unsure of the intent of Congress. 7 Out of respect for tribal
sovereignty, the Court decided to wait for more explicit direction
from Congress before opening the federal courthouse doors to
those complaining of abuse of tribal power where no incarceration
by the tribe is involved. 8
Since that time, enforcement of the ICRA-except for federal
habeas corpus petitions9-has been before tribal courts. This
enforcement has been far from ineffective. Tribal courts have
heard ICRA cases, some have held against the tribes, and have
enjoined tribal activity seen to be in violation of the federal statute.'0 In some cases, tribal courts have interpreted the ICRA
more strictly than the pre-Martinez federal courts. For example,
one tribal court imposed on the tribes all the requirements of the
Constitution, which appears unnecessary under the ICRA."
Experience has shown that the Martinez Court was correct when
3. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1988).
4. "Two distinct and competing purposes are manifest in the provisions of the ICRA:
In addition to its objective of strengthening the position of individual tribal members vis-avis the tribe, Congress also intended to promote the well-established federal 'policy of
furthering Indian self-government."' Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62
(1978).
5. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
6. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 52 (1978).
7. id. at 69.
8. Id. at 72.
9. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1988). Section 1303 contains an entitlement to petition the federal
courts in habeas corpus to challenge tribal court incarceration alleged to be in violation of
the ICRA. Id.
10. See the cases collected in the U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL
RIGHTS AcT 11-12 (1991).

11. See Conroy v. Bear Runner, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6037 (Oglala App. 1984).
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it observed that "[tjribal forums are available to vindicate rights
created by the ICRA, and [section] 1302 has the substantial and
intended effect of changing the law which these forums are
obliged to apply.'

12

Notwithstanding the enforceability of the ICRA in tribal
courts, there are those who think that Congress should look at
Martinez again and, perhaps, overturn the result. Hence this
Committee is now considering whether federal review, either collateral or appellate, should exist where violation of the ICRA is
alleged.
It is fitting that the Congress take steps to extend the reach
and the effect of the ICRA with substantial reluctance-a reluctance made evident by this Committee's deliberations. After all,
the ICRA is not only an imposition by the Congress on the governing powers of once-independent sovereign powers. More to
the point, the ICRA imposes upon the tribes limitations on governing powers that evolved in our, not their, legal history. These
limitations on government-due process; equal protection, trial by
jury, protection from double jeopardy, freedom of speech and religion and the like-are grand and noble concepts, but the tribes,
too, have independently come to equally grand and noble ways of
governing. Congress surely has the power to destroy these old
ways,13 but it should not do so nonchalantly. The continued federal recognition of, and support for, Indian tribal sovereignty--of
the right of the Indians to "make their own laws and be ruled by
them" 14 -is part of that which makes one proud to be an
American.
One of the articles of faith that has made America wise is our
tolerance for diversity. Americans know that being different is not
the same as being wrong. This tolerance for diversity has special
force when it comes to American Indians because they were here
first. The Supreme Court was never more wise than when it
observed that "[i]t must always be remembered that the various
12. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 65.
13. As the Court in Martinez recognized, "Congress has plenary authority to limit,
modify or eliminate the powers of self-government which the tribes otherwise possess."
Martinez, 436 U.S. at 56. The existence of and justification for this plenary power is a
matter of enormous jurisprudential interest, and many of my colleagues in the field
consider it entirely improper, and even immoral, that a discussion should go on without
recognition of this issue and inspection of the policies involved. See Robert A. Williams, The
Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the
White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219, 222. I am assuming, however,
that the existence of the power in Congress to enact the ICRA is not open for debate today
before this Committee.
14. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
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Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and
that their claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own
Government."'5
I am one of those people who believe that the ICRA can be
extended to cover civil law suits in federal courts without destroying tribal sovereignty. In fact, I believe that an extension of the
ICRA may be necessary to save tribal sovereignty for the next
century.
The irony of this position does not escape me. The ICRA is a
limitation on governmental power. It imposes Anglo-American
norms that are to some extent foreign to the tribes' forms of government. It is beyond the power of Congress to impose American
norms on any other known sovereign entity in the world. I have
begun this testimony with praise for tribal sovereignty and have
urged care in placing limits upon it. Yet, the argument can be
made that an expansion of the ICRA is necessary in order to save
tribes as governments. I feel that the true threat to tribal government comes less from the ICRA than from the Supreme Court
case of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.1
Within the space of a few months in 1978 the Supreme Court
decided both Martinez and Oliphant. Martinez denied a federal
7
forum for persons complaining of the exercise of tribal power.'
Oliphant created a federal forum for persons seeking to attack the
very existence of tribal power.' 8 The Oliphant attack, however, is
available only to non-Indians. Since that time, white plaintiffs'
attorneys have been increasingly more creative in taking cases in
which the true gravamen is the exercise of tribal power and framing them as cases attacking the existence of tribal power. Correspondingly, federal judges in these cases have been actively
dismantling tribal governments through extension of Oliphant. If
Indian tribes are to survive into the twenty-first century, this common law destruction of sovereignty has got to stop. The solution
proposed here is to give federal judges the precision of the ICRA,
and to take from them the obscure Oliphantcommon law test.
This testimony proposes a grand bargain: We must acknowledge that tribal governments are in the business of governing all
those who come within their reservations and, in exchange, the
15. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (emphasis
added).
16. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
17. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 52.
18. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 191 (1977).
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federal courts must be given jurisdiction to hear collateral attacks
on the exercise of tribal governing. At the outset, let me make it
clear that such a "bargain" can not be made between this Committee and one white law professor from Arkansas. Of course, I speak
for no tribe, nor any individual Indian.
Furthermore, let me note that there appears to be no particular outpouring of Indian opinion advocating that Oliphant needs
overturning. If Congress amends the ICRA to acknowledge the
existence of tribal power over non-Indians, I am not at all sure
which tribes, if any, would decide to exercise that power. Based
on an intellectual and moral symmetry, my testimony sets forth
the theoretical basis for a "bargain" between Congress and the
tribes over the future of the Oliphant and Martinez holdings; the
precepts of federal Indian law, as I perceive them, require that the
two cases be reconsidered together, not separately. But the "bargain" is only, for me to propose, not to make. It is the tribes who
must decide whether the elimination of Oliphant is worth the
overriding of Martinez and the extension of the ICRA. Similarly, it
is, in the end, only the tribes who will decide whether to exercise
the power over non-Indians that I am proposing that Congress
should acknowledge to exist.
I present below four basic propositions that support this
position.
PROPOSITION ONE: ANY EXTENSION OF THE ICRA
must BE ACCOMPANIED BY A LEGISLATIVE REVERSAL OF

Oliphant.
To extend the civil reach of the ICRA without reversing Oliphant would be to send a stark message: The ICRA's protections
are good enough for Indians, but white people deserve more. Sensible people would prefer that Congress do nothing, rather than
send such a racist message.
As mentioned above, from the very beginning in 1968, Congress intended that the ICRA both limit and foster tribal selfdetermination. This is surely not the first, nor the last, time that
Congress has or will undertake to serve conflicting purposes in one
statute. The world has few absolutes, and the essence of careful
legislation is the accommodation of such conflicts. For example,
legislation protective of forest land must account for the jobs of
those who cut down trees for a living; bankruptcy legislation must
protect the rights of both creditors and debtors; clean air legislation must be concerned with the businesses that make
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automobiles; and the closing of military bases must compromise
both federal savings and local impact. Indian law is replete with
accommodations of conflicting policies. And these accommodations are clearly seen in the ICRA, in which Congress crafted a
statute that guarantees the rights of individuals before tribal bodies and at the same time supports the sovereignty of those
bodies.19
Congress should take to heart the very practical position of
the United States Commission on Civil Rights in its recent report
on the ICRA which provides that words alone do not foster tribal
sovereignty, but must be accompanied by funding to make tribal
courts work.2 ° Such increased funding is the clearest way to
advance tribal sovereignty and to protect individual rights at the
same time. In addition, Congress, if it chooses to extend the ICRA,
has a further opportunity to shelter tribal sovereignty while guaranteeing personal liberty.
All must concede that to extend the civil reach of the ICRA
without addressing the destruction of tribal sovereignty that Oliphant accomplished would be a blow to tribal self-determination.
As the Supreme Court noted in Martinez, "[s]ection 1302 has the
substantial and intended effect of changing the law which these
[tribal] forums are obliged to apply. ' 2 1 To keep the balance level
and the doctrine alive, Congress must simultaneously take steps to
foster tribal government. And the best way to foster tribal government is to acknowledge forthrightly that tribes, as governments,
have the ability to do what governments do-govern.
Here are two principles of government: (1) Governments
exercise power over people not all of whom consent to every particular exercise of that power, and (2) governments do not always
do everything right, from the standpoint of those people. It is
absolutely clear and unobjectionable that when the subjects of
governmental power wish to complain, they should first petition
the government, tribal government in this case. The two issues for
this Committee are whether those people should have a forum in
which to complain outside of the government exercising its power
19. Martinez, U.S. at 62.
20. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS AcT 72-74 (1991).

"The Commission strongly supports the pending and proposed congressional initiatives to
authorize funding of tribal courts in an amount equal to that of an equivalent State court.
The Commission is hopeful that this increased funding will allow for much needed increases
in salaries for judges, the retention of law clerks for tribal judges, the funding of public
defenders/defense counsel, and increased access to legal authorities." Id. at 72-73.
21. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 65.
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over them, and whether white people should be exempt from the
first principle given above.
These two questions are necessarily linked. Creating a federal
ICRA forum for persons complaining of the exercise of tribal
power may, in the end, be wise congressional action. This federal
ICRA forum should be all the protection that non-Indians need to
ensure that they are treated fairly by tribal governments. if Congress acknowledges that tribal governments are in the business of
governing all those who enter reservations, then the federal courts
could sensibly be given jurisdiction to hear collateral attacks on
the exercise of that governing: In fact, the Supreme Court suggested this linkage in Oliphant by noting that tribes ought to be
able to exercise even criminal jurisdiction over whites "in a manner acceptable to Congress."22 As Proposition Three sets forth
below, it should have been clear, even in 1978, that the ICRA was
exactly the "manner acceptable to Congress,

'2 3

and Congress

ought to take this opportunity to make certain the Court understands this.
Legislation overruling Martinez and allowing for collateral
attacks under the ICRA on tribal activity must be carefully crafted.
Congress recognizes that the mere existence of federal collateral
attack represents a very real threat to local self-determination.
For example, in other contexts such as federal habeas corpus petitions challenging state convictions, Congress has been careful to
protect local autonomy.24 The Supreme Court also recognizes this
truth when it established its rules for federal abstention in cases
involving attacks against on-going state litigation.25 Proposition
Four sets forth in some detail the limits that should be placed on
ICRA collateral attacks or direct appeals. These procedural limitations are in recognition of the fact that tribal governments are
fragile; that this fragility has come mainly through their relations
with us; that these governments were here first; and that they are
older than our own.
But, Proposition One sets forth a more momentous part of the
bargain than the procedural rules of federal jurisdiction. The basis
of the bargain is this: Without the reversal of Oliphant, without
the recognition that tribes may govern all those who venture onto
22. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210 (emphasis added).
23. Id.
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988) (exhaustion of state court remedies) and app. at 430,
item 12: "Caution: In order to proceed in the federal court, you must ordinarily first
exhaust your state court remedies .. "
25. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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its reservations, without the acknowledgement that they were
doing just that well before Oliphant,well before our Constitution,
well before Columbus, then there is no bargain. An ICRA extension without a reversal of Oliphantis purely and simply damaging
to the rights of self-determination, and ought not to happen. If the
rights guaranteed by the ICRA are good enough for Julia Martinez, they are good enough for Mark Oliphant, and for me.
Oliphant dealt only with the criminal jurisdiction of one small
tribe over non-Indians. But its extension by the courts has been
immense. Its reasoning is not limited to the Suquamish Tribe
alone and the case's expansion into the area of civil jurisdiction has
been numbing. Once the Supreme Court made it an issue of federal common law whether a tribe could exert its power over nonIndians, any non-Indian's lawyer could mount an attack on the
very existence of tribal power instead of messing with the minutiae of the congressionally mandated ICRA. Every area of governmental power is open to attack. Challenges have been mounted
against tribal taxation of whites, 26 tribal zoning regulations applicable to white-owned land, 7 tribal hunting and fishing rules as
applied to whites, 8 and tribal civil adjudicatory authority over
whites. 29 Not all of these challenges to tribal governing power
have been successful, but all have struck at the heart of that which
makes an Indian tribe an Indian tribe-its power to govern reservation activity. The reversal of Oliphant will end all of these challenges, to the great benefit of both the tribes and our federal
courts.
With respect to challenges to tribal civil power, Martinez and
Oliphant together have left federal judges in a tangible quandary.
Under Martinez, these judges are deprived of the chance to look
carefully at a precise ICRA challenge to the exercise of tribal civil
power. 30 But, under Oliphant and its civil-side extension, these
judges may destroy the power entirely.3
I could set out the exact prohibitions of the ICRA, but Congress knows them well. In 1968, the first time Congress attempted
to write an "Indian Bill of Rights," it applied the entire Constitution to the tribes. But Congress wisely rejected that bill and
26. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
27. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492

U.S. 408 (1989).
28.
29.
30.
31.

See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
See National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1977).
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instead carefully wrote what is now section 1302 to control only
certain tribal powers. Giving only the best-known example, the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution threatens destruction of
tribal theocracies far older than the Constitution itself. When
Congress was informed of the problem by representatives of the
New Mexico Pueblos, it enacted the ICRA without any restrictions
on tribal establishment of religion, even while protecting the free
exercise of religion by individuals.3 2
Martinez, in denying the existence of the federal civil ICRA
forum, took from federal judges the precision of this statute.
Courts may not determine whether the tribal civil power was used
fairly against a plaintiff. They may not apply sensible and precise
tests like whether the tribe denied a person the equal protection
of its laws, whether due process was given, whether freedom of
speech was denied, or whether private property was taken without just compensation.
The protections of the ICRA are most explicit and precise
with respect to the procedural safeguards available when the tribe
prosecutes for crime. The ICRA is very comfortably and exactly
applied to criminal cases under the habeas corpus provision of section 1303. But, under Oliphant and its civil-side extensions, federal judges are given the ability, under federal common law, to
destroy the tribal power in its entirety.3 3 To use a medical metaphor: Unable to do careful civil surgery on the tribe with an ICRA
scalpel, the judge can only lop off the patient's head with the blunt
instrument of Oliphant.
This Committee should let both of these results change. The
ICRA should become what it was intended to be: A carefully balanced, congressionally mandated check on both the civil and criminal aspects of the exercise of tribal power. Additionally, federal
judges should be relieved of the job of having to decide about the
existence of power in governments that are older than their own,
all under some vague "inconsistent with their status" test.34
PROPOSITION TWO: THE REVERSAL OF Oliphantmust
come through a congressional acknowledgement of tribal
power, not through a delegation of it to the tribes.
The threat to local autonomy posed by the ICRA is nothing
compared to the threat posed by the Constitution of the United
32. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) (1988).
33. Oliphant,435 U.S. at 191
34. Id. at 208 (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (1976)).
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States. Congress recognized this fact when it chose from among
the provisions of the Bill of Rights in creating the ICRA list that is
contained in section 1302 of title 25 to the United States Code. 35
Once again, reference should be made to the lack of an Establishment Clause in the ICRA, the absence of which protects the very
old tribal theocracies. Similarly, Congress perceived that a
requirement of free counsel in criminal cases would be beyond the
means of very poor Indian tribes. Apparently unwilling to supply
federal funds for this purpose, Congress wrote: "No Indian tribe
in exercising powers of self-government shall... (6) deny to any
person in a criminal proceeding the right.., at his own expense to
36
have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
The pre-Martinez federal courts also understood that the
ICRA places different limits on tribal activity than the Constitution
places on the states and the federal government, even when the
statute uses constitutional language. For example, when the
Tenth Circuit looked at the sex discrimination in Martinez, it recognized that such discrimination by a state was not allowed under
the Constitution, but that the ICRA inquiry did not stop there.
On the whole, the pre-Martinez federal courts were careful to balance the individual rights guaranteed by the ICRA against the
necessity of the old ways to tribal survival and self-government, a
balance that could not be undertaken if the Constitution applied.
38
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Duro v. Reina,
warned Congress that a delegation of governmental power to the
tribes might well be a federal action to which constitutional
restrictions would apply.3 9 As in the recent "Duro-fix, ' ' 40 Congress
must be careful to reverse Oliphant in a way that does not destroy
tribal sovereignty while trying to save it.
The very structure of Oliphant shows that it is possible to
heed Justice Kennedy's warning and reverse the case without the
Constitution attaching. Recall that the OliphantCourt undertook,
in Part I of the opinion, to discover an "unspoken assumption"' 4 1 shared, it thought, by the Congress-that tribes have no power to
try non-Indians for crimes committed on the reservation.42 To be
35. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 62-63 and nn. 13-14.
36. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (1988) (emphasis added).
37. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1046 (10th Cir. 1976).
38. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
39. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990).
40. Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (1991) amending Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077,
104 Stat. 1892 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (Supp. 1992)).
41. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203.
42. Id. at 195-206.
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generous to the Court, it was doing its best to determine what
Congress thought about the problem presented in the case. The
Court found that Congress had assumed, without saying, that no
such power existed in tribes. 3 This "unspoken assumption" was
given "considerable weight" by the Court in Part II of the opinion,44 compelling it to conclude that Mark Oliphant must be
released. 5
For the Congress to say that the Court got its "unspoken
assumption" wrong could hardly be federal action to which the
Constitution attaches. A congressional acknowledgement that
such jurisdiction exists and always has would reverse the Oliphant
result, or belie the "considerable weight" that the Court gave to
the "unspoken assumption." The Court will ultimately decide the
issue, but if Chief Justice Rehnquist meant what he wrote, which
seems fair to suppose, the spoken assumption by this body that
tribes have and always have had the power to govern those who
submit themselves to tribal jurisdiction by their presence on the
reservation, should be given even greater weight.
Our Constitution is a consensual document. It creates a government as ordained by "We the People," and its amendments are
only valid when ratified by Congress and the states. But the
Indian tribes were governments before there was a Constitution.
Indian people were not part of the "We" who wrote the Constitution,46 and tribes, as governments, do not ratify the amendments.
The Court in the famous case of Talton v. Mayes 47 was correct in
stating: "It follows that as the powers of local self-government
enjoyed by the Cherokee nation existed prior to the Constitution,
they are not operated upon by the Fifth Amendment, which...
had for its sole object to control the powers conferred by the Constitution on the National Government.

' 48

Oliphant was based on what the Court thought this body
assumed.49 If the Court was wrong, then Congress may correct it,
and change the result in Oliphant. The linkage urged here is that
the reversal of Oliphant's destruction of tribal sovereignty should
accompany any statutory extension of the ICRA which provides
43. Id. at 201-06.
44. Id. at 206.
45. Id. at 212.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added): "Representatives ... shall be
apportioned among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers ...
excluding Indians not taxed."
47. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
48. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1986).
49. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208.
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for collateral or direct review. As Proposition Three will show,
amending the ICRA can accomplish both results. If this Committee extends the ICRA, it must legislatively reverse Oliphant.

PROPOSITION THREE:

THE ICRA IS THE PERFECT
VEHICLE TO OVERTURN BOTH Oliphant AND Martinez.

The reversal of Martinez is easy-all Congress must do is
explicitly create the civil cause of action that the Court held was
not implied by the ICRA. As set out in Proposition Four, Congress
should also enact various limitations on collateral review, such as a
requirement that tribal remedies be exhausted first, so federal
judges are not left to guess at their existence.
The Oliphant Court's treatment of the ICRA shows that an
ICRA amendment can reverse Oliphant. In its search for the
"unspoken assumption" by Congress, the Court turned its attention to the ICRA in footnote 6.50 This discussion clearly shows that
Congress' acknowledgement of tribal court jurisdiction over nonIndians could have been found in the ICRA. As the future Chief
Justice wrote for the Court:
Respondents do contend that Congress has "confirmed" the power of Indian tribes to try and to punish
non-Indians through.., the Indian Civil Rights Act....
The [ICRA] merely extends to "any person" within the
tribe's jurisdiction certain enumerated guarantees of the
Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution.
As respondents note, an early version of the [ICRA]
extended its guarantees only to "American Indians,"
rather than to "any person." The purpose of the later
modification was to extend the Act's guarantees to "all
persons who may be subject to the jurisdiction of tribal
governments, whether Indians or non-Indians." But this
change was certainly not intended to give Indian tribes
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Nor can it be read
to "confirm" respondents' argument that Indian tribes
have inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Instead, the modification merely demonstrates Congress'
desire to extend the Act's guarantees to non-Indians if
and where they come under a tribe's criminal or civil

50. Id. at 195-96 n.6.
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Act
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Consider carefully Justice Rehnquist's last three sentences.
The first of these three is certainly correct; it is absolutely true that
Congress did not then, nor should it now, "give "52 the tribes the
jurisdiction that Oliphant found lacking. The younger government can hardly give the power to govern to the older government. The strength of the United States and the small number of
her Indian people make it important that the younger government now confirm and acknowledge the existence of the power,
but this is no donation. Therein lies the constitutional trap that
Justice Kennedy warned against in Duro: if Congress is seen by
the courts to be granting power to the tribes, the Constitution may
attach to tribal activity.
Justice Rehnquist's second and third sentences represent the
Court's choice between two different ways to read Congress'
"unspoken assumption" as supposedly reflected in the 1968
ICRA.5 3 Exactly what did the Congress mean when it made the
change from "American Indians" to "all persons" in guaranteeing
rights under the ICRA? One may suspect that the Court incorrectly guessed the meaning of the 1968 change. It seems sensible
to read this change as congressional recognition that tribes had
jurisdiction over "persons," not just "Indians." In any case, Congress can now straighten the Court out and make it clear that the
second sentence does describe its "assumption," now "spoken."
The ICRA "confirms" Congress' understanding of what is and
always has been the case: Indian tribes, like all governments, have
the power to govern those who submit themselves to a government's jurisdiction, and submission comes through physical presence in the government's territory.

PROPOSITION

FOUR: WHETHER THE ICRA IS
EXTENDED BY PROVIDING FOR COLLATERAL ATITACK OF
TRIBAL ACTIVITY IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, OR BY
PROVIDING FOR DIRECT APPELLATE REVIEW IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, CONGRESS SHOULD IMPOSE
SUBSTANTIAL ABSTENTION REQUIREMENTS TO PREVENT
UNDUE HARM TO TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS.
The Bill included with the invitation to testify provides for a
51. Id. (citations omitted).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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direct appeal of ICRA cases from the highest tribal court to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Other proposals have been made to overrule Martinez directly and allow for
collateral attack on tribal court judgments and other tribal governmental activity in federal district courts. There are a number of
concerns that the Committee should evaluate as it considers these
various proposals.
A.

Whether on Direct Appeal or on CollateralAttack, the
FederalForum Should Await the Exhaustion of All
Tribal Remedies.

The direct appeal proposal requires that a suit must first be
brought in tribal court and that the only available route to federal
court is by appeal of the final decision before the tribe. If the
Committee recommends, instead, that federal district court collateral attacks be allowed, then it should explicitly require an exhaustion requirement. Some courts, both pre- and post-Martinez,
found this requirement implicit in the present ICRA,5 4 but it
should now be made explicit.
Under the procedures of many tribes, the final local appeal
will often be to the tribal council, a political body. The complaining party should be required under the ICRA to take this step
either before appealing or before suing under the ICRA. This
requirement will allow the federal courts to avoid the troubling
determination of whether internal tribal politics make such an
appeal "fruitless." 5 5 The only exception ought to be if the federal
court finds that the tribe acted in bad faith by delaying the operation of the tribal remedies.5 6
B.

No Money Damages Should Be Allowed Against the
Tribe Unless It Waives Its Own Sovereign
Immunity.

The continuation of tribal sovereign immunity would be fairly
clear under the proposal before the Committee for direct appellate review. Sovereign immunity is a doctrine with application
beyond ICRA questions, and would not be subject to reversal on
appeal from a tribal court to the Federal Circuit. 7 If this Commit54. See White v. Pueblo of San Juan, 728 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir. 1984); O'Neal v.
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1973).
55. See e.g., Howlette v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976).
56. See e.g., Olney Runs After v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 437 F. Supp. 1035
(D.S.D. 1977).
57. Tribal sovereign immunity is subject to congressional limitation. See Santa Clara
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tee proposes collateral attack in federal district court, then the
statute should make clear that money damages are not allowed
and sovereign immunity may be preserved at the tribe's option.
This provision is critical because small, impoverished tribes are the
governmental entities least likely to survive large damage suits.
Notwithstanding the merits of the plaintiffs claim, school buses
and fire trucks must continue to run, and other tribal services must
be performed for the welfare of the people at large.
C.

The Committee Should Carefully Consider the Financial
Impact on Tribes That Will Be Brought About by
ICRA Review.

The proposal that the Federal Circuit hear all ICRA appeals
from tribal court may have a certain bureaucratic niceness to it,
but it is going to be very expensive for the western tribes to litigate all of their appeals in Washington, D.C. The Eighth, Ninth
and Tenth Circuits are much closer to the reservations, and if the
appeals were to local circuit courts, the tribes would conserve valuable resources. The individual plaintiffs in ICRA cases, who often
are tribal members or other people who live on the reservation,
would also benefit.
The United States Commission on Civil Rights, in its recent
report on the ICRA,5 8 is very persuasive in its linkage of ICRA
rights and federal funding of the tribes in general, and tribal courts
in particular. This link is fundamental to anything that this Committee does with respect to the ICRA. The best way for Congress
to support ICRA justice before tribal bodies is to ensure that tribes
have the resources that are necessary to ensure fairness. From this
perspective, the money spent traveling to litigate appeals in Washington D.C. could better be spent on the improvement of tribal
government.
On collateral attack, a similar policy would be advanced by a
meaningful amount-in-controversy requirement, analogous to the
requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction.5 9 For example, suppose a plaintiff seeks to enjoin the tribe from the collection of a tax.
A $10,000 in-controversy requirement would protect the tribe
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). Courts are correctly reluctant to find such a
unilateral waiver without an unequivocal expression. Id. Nevertheless, the legislative
history of any congressional extension of the ICRA should demonstrate that Congress is not
waiving tribal sovereign immunity under the "due process" rubric in § 1302(8).

58.

U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS AcT (1991).

59. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
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from frivolous claims, by insisting that the plaintiff have enough at
stake to be worth the federal court's valuable time.
D.

Whether on Direct Appeal or CollateralAttack, There
Ought to Be Meaningful Abstention Doctrines to
Restrain Over-eager Federal Courts.

Congress, the courts, and scholars are all aware of the threat
to local autonomy that is presented by the very existence of federal courts who have power to second-guess local decisions.6 ° All
three groups recognize that, even though federal judges often
advance the interests of justice, these same federal judges should
be restrained by various abstention doctrines so that they do not
interfere too quickly with local self-determination. These concerns raised by our federalist government are more stark when
the threatened governments are very old, very fragile tribal governments. Congress must never forget how much more intrusive
federal court review is to tribal governments than it is to state governments. Federal court oversight that New Mexico can survive
with its sovereignty intact might crush the San Juan Pueblo.
Thus, regarding the proposal for direct Federal Circuit
review, I would make the appeal not one of right, but of privilege,
similar to the writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court. The interest of tribal self-determination, federal abstention
and the federal court case load weigh in favor of discretionary
review before a federal court of appeals.
Regarding the proposal for collateral attack in federal district
court, I would write into the statute the familiar federal abstention
doctrines that apply to federal challenges to state actions. For
example, the Younger v. Harris6 1 Court's restraint on federal
review of on-going state procedures seems entirely consistent with
the proposal that tribal remedies be exhausted before suit is
brought in federal court.
Likewise, the Committee ought to propose that a "political
question" doctrine be applied liberally in whatever federal review
is created. The pre-Martinez history of ICRA litigation teaches
that, if the case is overruled and the ICRA extended, many of the
plaintiffs will be Indians suing their own tribes over electionrelated controversies." Such a situation speaks of the need for
60. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States and the
Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1989).
61. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
62. See, e.g., Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975).
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caution and restraint in fashioning judicial remedies for electoral
disputes, and a political question doctrine seems appropriate.
6 3 the
For example, in White Eagle v. One Feather,
Eighth Circuit was called upon to determine whether the one-person, onevote constitutional requirement of Reynolds v. Sims 6 4 should
apply, under the ICRA, to tribal elections.65 It is easy to forget just
6 6 which
how close the Supreme Court came in Baker v. Carr,
was
decided prior to Reynolds, to deciding that federal courts had no
jurisdiction over matters of apportionment.67 Under the ICRA,
federal courts ought to rediscover a reluctance to intrude into
political matters and to dismiss essentially political controversies.
Furthermore, the political question doctrine ought to be applied
more liberally under the ICRA than it is under the Constitution.
The ICRA, after all, is being imposed by the United States Congress unilaterally on governments that have not ratified it. When
the governments are small and vulnerable, the history of litigation
is very political, and the federal courts are unused to deciding
issues of tribal law, an active political question doctrine seems
appropriate.
E.

On the Merits of ICRA Cases, the Statute Should Be
Read With Respect Both for Traditional Tribal
Ways and for Valid, Modern Innovation.

The federal courts were, on the whole, rather respectful of
tribal tradition in the pre-Martinez ICRA cases. Most of these
cases balanced the plaintiff's right to be protected from the offending action, against the tribe's right to carry on tribal tradition.
Congress should make sure that this respect continues if the ICRA
is extended. Federal courts should be reluctant to strike down tribal tradition in the name of Anglo-American jurisprudence and
history.
It is less commonly recognized that tribes, like all governments, need to evolve to meet new societal conditions. Perhaps
the greatest harm that the ICRA could do to tribal governments is
to freeze them into pre-Columbian days, and leave them unwilling
to depart from tradition for fear of being second-guessed by a federal judge. If tribes are to be modern functioning governments,
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311, 1312 (8th Cir. 1973).
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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they must have the ability to find new solutions to new problems.
Thus it ought to be part of the legislative history of any extension
of the ICRA that Congress recognizes the legitimacy of such evolution, and that tribes need not necessarily make the same governmental choices as the dominant society in order for their actions to
survive ICRA inspection.
CONCLUSION
Many of my colleagues in the field of Indian law view the
ICRA with disfavor. This Committee may hear from some of them
during these proceedings. They will not be pleased with my advocating the extension of the ICRA. (And I will no doubt hear about
it in the law reviews!) But I hope that my colleagues as well as this
Committee will remember that I insist on the Oliphant"bargain."
In my view, the surest way to crush tribal sovereignty and to guarantee that it will not survive the turn of the century, is to extend
the civil application of the ICRA without reversing the terrible
effect of Oliphant. I am sure that there are those in this country
who would do just that for the very purpose of destroying tribal
sovereignty. I am equally certain that they are wrong.

